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ABSTRACT 
The social and economic developments in European countries have put pressure on their 
national budgets and threaten the sustainability of public policies. The traditional fiscal 
indicators, which are still used today as guiding tools, have proved to be insufficient, due to 
their arbitrary nature and short-term focus. In this paper, we resort to an alternative fiscal 
indicator, known as ‘generational accounting’, which considers how current fiscal policy 
affects, not only, current generations, but also future generations. We apply this methodology 
to assess the long-term fiscal situation of Portugal, and compare the results with those 
obtained in 1999. In this context, we also explore additional scenarios, as well as additional 
indicators, in order to provide some robustness to our findings. Our results show that, if the 
current fiscal policy is not significantly changed, future generations will face a much heavier 
fiscal burden than current generations. 
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ABSTRACT 
Os desenvolvimentos económicos e sociais nos países europeus colocaram pressão sobre os 
seus orçamentos nacionais e ameaçam a sustentabilidade das políticas públicas. Os 
indicadores fiscais tradicionais, que ainda hoje são utilizados como ferramentas de orientação, 
provaram ser insuficientes, devido à sua natureza arbitrária e foco de curto prazo. Nesta 
dissertação, recorremos a um indicador fiscal alternativo, conhecido como ‘contabilidade de 
gerações’, que mostra como é que a atual política fiscal afeta, não só, as gerações atuais, mas 
também as gerações futuras. Esta metodologia é utilizada para avaliar a situação fiscal de 
Portugal no longo prazo, e comparar os resultados com os obtidos em 1999. Neste contexto, 
recorremos, ainda, a cenários adicionais, assim como indicadores adicionais, para avaliar a 
robustez dos resultados obtidos. Estes resultados demonstram que, se a política fiscal não for 
significativamente alterada, as gerações futuras terão de suportar uma carga fiscal muito 
superior à das gerações atuais. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the stability of public finances in the European countries has been 
under pressure. Among the causes of this instability are the slowing of economic growth, and 
the ageing of the population. With lower economic growth, on a macroeconomic level, the 
economies will generate fewer resources, and governments will have a smaller base from 
which they are able to collect revenues. On a microeconomic level, fewer jobs will be created, 
implying that some agents will not find placement in the job market, and, therefore, will not 
be able to contribute to public budgets, and will also receive unemployment benefits. The 
ageing of the population poses a problem for two reasons. On the one hand, a reduction of the 
working population, and on the other hand, an increase in ageing related costs, namely on 
pension systems and healthcare. If we look at society as being composed by three major age 
groups according to the life cycle (childhood/youth, middle-aged/active, and 
elderly/retirement), both the elderly and youth groups would be net beneficiaries (benefits 
received are higher than taxes paid) of public budgets, while the middle-aged groups would, 
not only, be net contributors of public budgets, but also have to contribute enough to off-set 
the spending with net beneficiaries. Based on these arguments, it follows that the structure of 
the population decisively affects the balance of public budgets. 
The goal of this paper is to access the sustainability of the Portuguese fiscal system in 
the long run, to measure the net tax burdens for current/living and future (those that have not 
been born yet) generations, and to propose corrective policies in case of unsustainability or 
imbalances between the net tax payments of current and future generations. Traditional fiscal 
measures, namely deficit and debt accounting, focus only on the current and short term effects 
of fiscal policies, and may not accurately reflect government accounts, due to its arbitrary 
nature. Instead, we resort to Generational Accounting, a methodology that was initially 
developed by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991, 1992 and 1994), which is based on the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint, stating that present and future government 
spending must either be covered by current or future taxes and social security contributions, 
or by government net wealth. Depending on how they are financed, public policies have to be 
paid either by current or future generations, affecting their net wealth, and, therefore, they 
entail intergenerational distribution. Generational accounting is able to incorporate these long 
term implications of fiscal policy on intragenerational and intergenerational distribution and 
fiscal sustainability, while including future changes in the demographic structure of the 
population.  
To produce generational accounts, we require: projections of the population, taxes, 
transfers, and government expenditures; an initial value of government wealth; a growth rate 
and a discount rate. The analysis is forward-looking, and therefore it calculates only the future 
fiscal burdens that each generation faces. The year 2010 is set as the base year, with 
generations born before or in 2010 considered as the current generation, and generations born 
after 2010 considered as the future generations. Taxes and transfers are allocated to the 
population according to a micro-profile, based on their age, in order to reflect changes in these 
variables due to changes in the population structure. The rest of the variables are assumed to 
evolve at the same rate as the overall economy. The results obtained in this paper are then 
compared to the results in "Generational Accounting around the World" by Alan J. Auerbach, 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, and Willi Leibfritz, published in 1999, so that we can draw conclusions 
from the recent policies followed by Portugal in terms of the sustainability of fiscal policy, 
and if further changes are required. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 highlights some of the changes in 
the Portuguese economy and demography that will affect the sustainability of the fiscal 
system. Section 3 explains the relevance of the generational accounting method in comparison 
to the traditional methods. Section 4 describes the theoretical framework and the methodology 
of generational accounting. Section 5 defines the process of estimation of the variables and 
parameters of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. This includes population 
projections and developments; relying on the age specific micro-profiles in order to assign 
taxes, social security and other contributions, transfers and benefits; fiscal data and 
government accounts; and the choice for the growth and discount rates. Section 6 presents the 
applied data of generational accounting and the respective results, and compares them with 
the results obtained in the accounts of 1999. Section 7 provides a sensitivity analysis of the 
obtained results. Section 8 describes theoretical and empirical limitations to this model. 
Section 9 provides the conclusions of this paper. 
2. Sustainability of Portugal’s fiscal system  
The Portuguese economy has been characterized by lower economic growth and 
successive current account deficits over the past years. As described by Pina and Abreu 
(2012), the low interest rates provided an easier access to credit in international markets. 
Given the decreasing levels of savings, consumption and investment were financed through 
increasing levels of public, as well as private debt. The authors also mention the bias of 
investment and credit towards sectors that provided non-tradable goods and services, which, 
along with the rigidity of the labour market and the lack of adjustment of wages to 
productivity, hindered the competitive position of the country and its ability to attract foreign 
investment. These factors generated a situation of instability that became unsustainable with 
the global financial and sovereign debt crises, due to the large decrease of external private 
financing. It led Portugal to sign a three year European Union-International Monetary Fund 
(EU-IMF) program of financial assistance in May 2011 until May 2014, implementing 
structural reforms with the goal of balancing the budget and stabilizing public debt levels, as 
well as to generate sustained and balanced growth. In this section, we give a brief description 
of some of the changes in the Portuguese economy and the demographic structure of the 
country that are likely to affect the sustainability of the fiscal system. 
We start by analyzing economic growth, described in Figure 1. From 1960 until 1973, 
we have a period of high growth and convergence towards industrialized countries, which was 
mainly due to the shift of resources from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector that 
occurred with the industrialization process. Between 1974 and 1985, we have a period of 
accentuated decline of economic growth, mainly due to the political and economic instability 
that came with the revolution in 1974. After two IMF interventions in 1978-79 and 1983-85, 
and joining the EEC (European Economic Community) in 1986, there is an inversion of this 
tendency and an increase in economic growth from 1986 to 1998. However, from 1999 
onward, there is a decrease of growth and a propensity for stagnation. 
According to Andrade, Duarte & Simões (2012), the growth in the 1986-1998 periods 
is explained by “…implementation of better macroeconomic policies (associated with the 
process of nominal convergence on the way to the euro in 1990s), structural reforms, 
especially in the financial, labour and product markets, but also investments in physical and 
human capital, and technology enhancing factors”; while the growth in the years from 1999 
onward is explained by the low levels of educational attainment, technological infrastructures 
and investment in R&D, as well as macroeconomic instability generated by an increase in the 
size of government and in the specialization in low productivity services.  
When it comes to public spending, Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) show that the vast 
majority of industrialized countries significantly increased their public spending, as well as 
their tax levels, in the post-World War II period, especially between 1960 and 1980. This 
conduct is explained by the growing influence of Keynesianism, with the development of the  
 Figure 1 – GDP Growth (%) 
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concept of externalities and the theory of public goods; the popularity of socialism and its 
redistributive policies; the stabilization tools that can be provided, for example, to reduce 
business cycles and unemployment; and the protection it provides to its citizens in risky 
situations, like temporary unemployment. Cunha, J. e Braz, C. (2012) explain that these 
policies were sustained by a high economic growth and a very favorable demographic 
structure (which resulted from the Baby Boom), with a high proportion of people of working 
age and, therefore, potential net contributors. The authors defend that most countries did not 
take into account that the revenues and expenditures should be adjusted to the resources 
generated by the economy to ensure the sustainability of public finances. Through the analysis 
of public expenditure (in % GDP), described in Figure 2, we can see that, in the period of 
1995 to 2010, Portugal followed the trend of increase in public spending (even though with a 
considerable lag,), converging to the average of the euro area and the European Union. The 
large increase in 2009 is in response to the international crisis by most member states of the 
union, whether through automatic stabilizers, or through stabilization policies. Nevertheless, 
as revenues were insufficient, Portugal accumulated fiscal deficits that resulted in a growing 
public indebtedness. In the last two decades, the fiscal deficit never fell significantly below 
3% of GDP (see Figure 3), which, combined with small economic growth, resulted in a 
gradual but sustained rise in public debt since 2000 (see Figure 4). In 2009, the “debt 
increase” shifted to a much steeper path, reaching 130% of GDP in 2014. 
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Figure 2 – Government Expenditures (% GDP)  
 
 
      Source: Eurostat, “General Government Expenditure and main aggregates” 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Fiscal Indicators (% of GDP)  
 
       
Source: OECD Economic Surveys, Portugal 2012 
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In the period of 1995-2010, as a result of the introduction of the euro and the transition 
to monetary stability, nominal and real interest rates in Portugal fell drastically. As described 
by Guillemette and Turner (2013), foreign investors “… rushed to invest in peripheral euro 
area countries, assuming that not only exchange rate risks, but also sovereign default risks, 
had largely been eliminated by the currency block”. The consequence of these large capital 
inflows were large current account deficits, as described in Figure 5. As a result, the net 
international investment position has deteriorated substantially (more specifically, from -9,3% 
in 1996 to -118,7% of GDP in 2013, as described in Figure 6). The international crisis caused 
risk perceptions to be re-adjusted, resulting in a decrease of capital inflows for the peripheral 
countries, and a lower sustainability of the deficits of current accounts as well. 
The combination of a rising public and external debt, slowing economic growth and 
the instability that came with the international financial crisis, led to a loss of confidence that 
Portugal would be able to fulfill its financial obligations, reflected in the lack of access to 
long-term financing at sustainable rates, culminating in the necessity of a financial assistance 
program signed with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (EU-IMF). 
The outcomes seem to be in line with the goals of the program. Economic growth is picking 
up, government expenditure are decreasing (as we can see in Figure 2), public deficit is 
decreasing, public debt is beginning to get under control, and predicted to decrease (as we can 
see in Figure 4), and its outlook is now seen as acceptable by 3 out of the 4 main rating 
agencies. However, a closer analysis of Figure 4 shows the fragility of the current situation.  
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Figure 5 – Current Account to GDP in Portugal (%) 
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Figure 6 – Portugal's Net International Investment Position (% of GDP) 
 
 
     Source: Eurostat, “Net international investment position in % of GDP” 
 
An increase in the interest rates or the inflation rates can lead the path of public debt 
back to unsustainability. 
The last topic we will address in this section is population ageing, the changes in the 
demographic structure, and the consequences for fiscal policy. Even though Portugal (and 
other EU member states) are familiar with this concept, its consequences have to be taken into 
account for policies that will affect future generations. Many policies of the welfare state that 
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provide citizens protection against risk (like social security), were institutionalized in a much 
more thriving demographic environment, with a younger population and with optimistic 
expectations of economic growth. The main reasons for this development are the continuous 
fall in fertility rates, combined with the increase in life expectancy, as shown in Figure 7 and 
Table 1, respectively. 
The change in fertility rates is due to a number of factors that can be attributed either 
to a cultural shift or to the economic situation. As we can see in Figure 7, after the euphoria of 
the post-war and the baby boom exhausted, the fertility rates fall steadily, down below the 
theoretical level of substitution of generations of two children. Inevitably, populations will 
decrease in the long-run in European countries and the demographic structure of the 
population will change, with a higher proportion of elderly in total population, if there are not 
enough migration gains to counterbalance this phenomenon. 
The increasing life expectancy of individuals relates to economic activity in a 
progressively problematic way, where the benefits of the elderly are inversely adjusted to the 
development of life expectancy. In these circumstances, old age ceases to be a singular risk 
that social security prevented in the few terminal years of every pensioner, substituting the 
earnings when the individual leaves the labor market definitely, and creating a new risk. This 
additional risk is associated with the possibility of pension benefits being insufficient to 
guarantee a decent standard of living to the beneficiary that faces new threats associated with 
longevity (mainly regarding healthcare and the funding of those pensions). The risks 
associated with dependency and with prolonged illness have a very significant effect in 
Portugal, as well as in other developed countries. Until now, the socialization of these risks 
associated with longevity has been low. The family solution has prevailed so far and the 
institutionalization of the elderly in residential nursing homes works as a solution of last 
resort, when the situations become too complicated to be managed inside the family. 
However, the shift in family structures in the last decades has increased the number of people 
with no family support to help them against these risks, which will lead to a higher demand of 
public long-term care services. The need of public protection against longevity risks is likely 
to increase even more in the future, given the information provided in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Total Fertility Rates 
  
 
     Source: Eurostat, “Fertility rates” 
 
Table 1 – Life Expectancy 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Life expectancy at birth (females) 81,3 82,3 82,2 82,4 82,6 82,8 83,8 83,6 84 84,4 84,3 
Life expectancy at birth (males) 74,9 75,5 75,9 76,2 76,5 76,7 77,3 77,3 77,6 78 78,1 
Healthy life years at birth (female) 57,1 57,9 57,8 57,6 56,4 56,6 58,6 62,6 62,2 55,4 55 
Healthy life years at birth (male) 58,6 60 58,5 59,1 58,3 59,3 60,7 64,5 63,9 58,3 58,2 
     Source: Eurostat, “Healthy life year indicators” 
We also need to take into account the pressure of ageing on government budgets and 
future generations. The evidence presented in Figure 8 and Table 2, regarding the 
development of public expenditures by function and old age dependency ratios, respectively, 
reflects the increase of government expenditures associated with the ageing phenomenon, as       
well as the burden that is going to fall on the working age population, or to be covered by 
future generations. Even though the costs regarding healthcare have been kept under control, 
as we can see from Figure 8, it seems obvious that social protection is the account that is 
putting pressure on public finances, and that this behavior is, mainly, due to old age related 
expenditures. While almost all accounts are below the 10% of GDP line, government 
expenditures with social protection were always above 10%, steadily increasing and diverging 
from all the other accounts, with 18,8% in 2012. Table 2 provides how old age dependency 
ratios changed overtime, as well as how they are predicted to change in the future, and are a 
good indicator of the burden that will fall upon current middle-aged/active and future 
generations.  
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Figure 8 – Government Expenditures (by function, in % GDP) 
 
 
    Source: Eurostat, “Government Expenditures by function” 
 
Table 2 – Old Age Dependency Ratios 
Actual Projected 
1965 12,8 1996 22,2 2003 24,9 2010 27,5 2020 34,6 
1970 14,9 1997 22,6 2004 25,3 2011 28,2 2030 43,6 
1975 15,7 1998 23,0 2005 25,7 2012 28,8 2040 55,6 
1980 17,8 1999 23,4 2006 26,0 2013 29,4 2050 65,3 
1985 18,2 2000 23,7 2007 26,3 2014 30,3 2060 64,9 
1990 20,0 2001 24,2 2008 26,6 2015 31,1 2070 67,0 
1995 22,0 2002 24,6 2009 27,0 2016 31,8 2080 69,0 
    Source: Eurostat, “Old Age dependency ratios” 
 
This indicator reflects the number of elderly people (with 65 years or more) per 100 
active/working age people (with age between 15 and 64). Therefore, a higher dependency 
ratio implies a higher “burden” on the working population with the expenditures of their 
elderly. As we can see, the projected ratios for the future are quite alarming, with more than 1 
elderly per 2 people of working age. And the scenario may be even worse, if we take into 
account that some of the people between 15 and 64 years may be studying, unemployed or 
non-participating in the labor force. Also, even though life expectancy at birth has increased, 
there is not only, a huge difference when compared to the healthy life years at birth indicator, 
but also a difference in the increase in years between the two indicators, with healthy life 
years increasing at a lower rate than life expectancy.  
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Summing up, with an ageing population and the number of beneficiaries of public 
budgets growing more than contributors, the distributive needs will keep increasing, which 
will put more pressure on national budgets. However, Portugal’s public finances are already 
under pressure, and even though the overall economic and financial outlook is improving, 
public debt is still far from assured sustainability.  
3. Deficit and Debt as a not well-defined measure 
In general, policy and decision makers take deficit and debt as the main guiding tools 
in fiscal policy. Take, for example, the target defined for public deficits at 3% or less of GDP 
for the countries in the European monetary Union. The main concerns with the traditional 
fiscal measures, specifically, debt and deficit accounting, are their arbitrary nature, and their 
focus on the current and short run effects of fiscal policies.  
Government expenditures and revenues, as well as the level of public debt, are 
published in annual government budgets and, therefore, capture the short-run effects of fiscal 
policy. This implies that a change of policy in a given year that yields an impact throughout 
many years in the future (or for more than one year, at least), may bear the risk of only being 
associated with its short-run effects (given by the budget of that same year), while its effects 
for the other years are going to be incorporated in those yearly budgets and may be 
disassociated with that specific policy. If agents are rational and forward looking, they will 
consider the impacts of fiscal policy on their lifetime budget constraint, and will readjust their 
consumption and savings level according to the new policy.  It is very unlikely that an annual 
government budget will be able to capture the whole effect of these changes, especially if they 
affect generations born in the future. Therefore, it is important to measure the effects of fiscal 
policy in the long-run, as it may affect the life cycle resources of current and future 
generations, by redistributing resources among them. 
As established in Auerbach, Kottlikoff and Leibfritz (1999), the arbitrary nature of 
these measures relies on the fact that they depend on how different governments or different 
countries choose to define their expenditures and their revenues. Governments can conduct 
any sustainable fiscal policy, and at the same time choose its accounting so as to report any 
surplus or deficit that they want. They are able to enact policies with huge intergenerational 
redistributive fiscal effects while reporting a “balanced budget”; or enact apparently identical 
fiscal policies with dramatically different time paths of reported deficits. However, the way 
governments choose to define their revenues and expenditures should be irrelevant for actual 
fiscal policy, since the economic effects of the fiscal policy followed will not depend in any 
way on the accounting labels chosen. 
We demonstrate these concerns with an example described in Raffelhüschen and 
Walliser (1999). In this example, we consider a model of two generations (young and old), 
that only live for two periods, and where there is no government activity before period 0. It is 
also assumed that the interest rate is 20% and that population growth is 10%. Given this 
model, we now study the impact of four different intergenerational redistribution policies on 
government budgets, with the results described in Table 3, also taken from Raffelhüschen and 
Walliser (1999).  
 
Table 3 – Traditional Fiscal measures 
 
    Source: Raffelhüschen and Walliser (1999), Table 6 
 
In scenario (a), there is a transfer of 100 units granted to the young generation in the 
first period, which is only paid for by that same generation in the next period. So, in period 0, 
there is an expenditure of 100 units that is not paid and, as a result, the budget deficit and 
government debt are also of 100 units in this period. In the next period (period 1), the now old 
generation has to cover the transfer that it has received in the previous period, so it pays taxes 
of 120 units, which is equal to the 100 units of transfer received in period 0, plus 20 units of 
interest payments on the public debt. If the policy is maintained in period 1, the young 
generation from period 1 receives 110 units, which increase from 100 units in period 0 due to 
population growth of 10%. In period 1, the government collects taxes of 120 units, and has 
expenditures with, not only of 110 units in transfers, but also of 20 units in interest payments, 
amounting to a total of 130 units. Thus, the deficit in period 1 will be of 10 units, and the 
government debt will accumulate to 110 units. If this policy is maintained for future periods, 
we can see that both government deficit and debt will grow at the same rate as the population.  
In scenario (b), the policy is the institution of a tax-financed pension system, in which 
generations will discount for their own pensions through the payment of taxes when they are 
young, and receive the pension benefits in the following period, when they are old. If this 
policy starts in period 0, the government will report a surplus and net wealth of 100 units, 
since young generations of this period will be taxed in 100 units, and old generations of this 
period will not receive any amount, since they have not discounted in the previous period. In 
period 1, the government has to pay 120 units to the old generation (100 units taxed in the 
previous period plus interest), and amounts revenues of 20 units, from the interest on 
accumulated wealth in the previous period, plus 110 units in taxes from the young 
generations, which increased from 100 units in the previous period due to the population 
growth. Therefore, the surplus in period 1 is of 10 units and net wealth is of 110 units, and 
both these accounts will grow at the rate of the population if the policy is maintained. 
We now turn to scenario (c), which is identical to scenario (b), but with one 
difference: the payments made by the young generations are classified as loans, which the 
government invests on the capital market. This implies that the amount collected from the 
young generations in each period does not classify as government revenue, and it will report a 
balanced budget and no debt in period 0. In period 1, if we assume perfect capital markets, the 
amount invested in period 0 (100 units) will yield a return of 20%, which is the defined 
interest rate. The interest receipts plus the amount invested will be enough to cover the debt to 
the now old generation of period 1 (loan granted plus interests). If this policy is maintained, 
both the loans from the young generation, and the respective debt payments in the following 
periods grow at the same rate as the population. However, in this case, government has a 
balanced budget in every period and, hence, has no debt. 
The last scenario (d) describes a policy that introduces a pay-as-you-go pension 
system. Under this type of system, the transfers received by the old generation in each period 
will equal the tax payments of the young generation of the same period. Basically, young 
generations finance the transfers of the old generations of their own period, expecting that the 
young generations in the next period will do the same for them. In this case, both the taxes 
paid by young generations and the transfers received by the old generations will grow at the 
same rate as the population. Also, taxes paid and transfers received are the same in each 
period, the budget is always balanced and the government debt is always equal to zero.  
If we analyze all four policies using the traditional fiscal measures (deficit and debt 
accounting), we conclude that: the policy enacted in scenario (b) achieves the most satisfying 
results, increasing the amount of net wealth over the years; the policy enacted in scenario (a) 
achieves the least satisfying results, increasing the amount of government debt over the years; 
policies (c) and (d) have no effect on the public budget and debt level, and are equivalent to 
one another.  
However, if we analyze these policies in terms of intergenerational distribution, and in 
terms of changes in the lifetime budget constraint, we conclude that, not only are the first 
three policies identical, but also indifferent, since they do not present any changes in terms of 
the present value of the net tax payments for each generation. In each one of these policies, 
whether the generations are receiving first and paying in the following period, or paying first 
and receiving in the following period, these payments and transfers take into account the 
opportunity cost of money, given in this example by the interest rate of 20%. In other words, 
the net present value of taxes paid minus transfers received over the life cycle for each 
generation has not changed. For that reason, rational agents do not have any incentive or 
reason to change their behavior with the policies described in scenarios (a), (b) or (c). We also 
conclude that the policies described in scenarios (d) and (c) are not equivalent. In scenario (d), 
the introduction of the pay-as-you-go system automatically increases the consumption 
possibilities of the old generation in period 0 who did not contributed to the system. This 
increase is financed by all other subsequent generations, who have their consumption 
possibilities reduced, since their rate of return under the pay-as-you-go system is equal to the 
population growth, which is lower than the interest rate.  
4. Generational Accounting 
Auerbach, Kottlikoff and Leibfritz (1999) state that fiscal policies have real effects, 
because they “…(1) alter economic incentives, (2) redistribute from different generations to 
the government, (3) redistribute within generations, or (4) redistribute across generations”, 
and they provide an alternative methodology to study these effects, called generational 
accounting, which is based on the intertemporal budget constraint of the government, 
described in equation (1). This equation establishes that the present value of the net tax 
payments (which encompass  taxes and contributions paid less social security, welfare, and 
other transfer payments received) of current and future generations have to be enough to 
cover the present value of government expenditures and the current level of net public debt. In 
short, it requires either current or future generations to cover overall public spending. Since 
one of the goals is to assess how the “fiscal burden” is distributed among different 
generations, the net tax payments of current and future generations must be analyzed 
separately. 
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As can be seen in equation (1), there are 4 main variables. Starting from left to right, 
the first element consists of the sum of the generational accounts of current generations. The 
term 𝑁𝑡,𝑘 represents the net tax payments of the generation born in year k, discounted to year t 
(the base year), and k goes from t – D (where D stands for the maximum age, in the base year) 
to t (the generation born in the base year). The second element of equation (1) represents the 
present value of the sum of the generational accounts of future generations. It is important to 
point out that these two variables encompass all the public revenues and expenditures that are 
directly dependent on the age structure of the population, and whose payments or benefits can 
be directly attributed to the population according to their age. Therefore, the third element of 
equation (1) consists of the present value of the sum of the net public expenditures 
(expenditures minus revenues) that do not depend on the age structure of the population. This 
includes government’s purchases of goods and services whose benefits are difficult to 
attribute to specific generations. This implies two things: 1 – generational accounting only 
tells us which generations will have to pay for the net public expenses defined by G, but it 
does not tell us which generation benefits from them, or how valuable or beneficial they are; 2 
– generational accounting is not able to completely show the full net benefit or burden for 
each generation from fiscal policy as a whole, but it is able to show the full net benefit or 
burden for a generation if there are changes from fiscal policy affecting variables included in 
the net tax payments (taxes and transfers), from all levels of government (federal, state, and 
local).The last element of equation (1),  𝑊𝑡
𝑔
, encompasses the government’s net wealth in 
year t (basically, the public assets minus public debt). Finally, looking at equation (1) overall, 
we can identify a “zero sum” characteristic for this intergenerational budget constraint. That 
implies that, for example, given a certain level of government net wealth, an increase in the 
present value of net public expenditures (third element of equation (1)) requires an increase in 
the present value of the generational accounts of either the current or future generations, or a 
combination of both (first and second element of equation (1)). 
We now proceed to a more detailed analysis on how to estimate the generational 
accounts, which follows a two-step process: 1 - Projecting the average taxes and transfer 
payments of each living generation for each year in the future during which at least some 
members of the current generation will be alive; 2 – Taking the projections estimated in the 
first step and discounting them to the base year, and also taking into account  the probability 
of the people from each generation to be alive in the future years. Thus, the generational 
account Nt,k is given by equation (2):  
 
𝑁𝑡,𝑘 =  ∑ 𝑇𝑠,𝑘
𝑘+𝐷
𝑠=𝜆
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𝑖
                                                                                                                                          (3)  
 
Where  𝜆 = 𝑚á𝑥(𝑡, 𝑘). The 𝑇𝑠,𝑘 variable stands for the net tax payments that are 
expected to be paid in year s by an average person of the generation born in year k. This can 
be better described by equation (3), where ℎ𝑠,𝑘,𝑖 stands for the average tax (if h > 0) or 
average transfer (if h < 0) of type i paid or received, respectively, in year s by an average 
person born in year k. The term Ps,k stands for the expected number of people who were born 
in year k and are still alive in year s. Notice that equation (2) is defined for the members of the 
current generation that were born before or after the base year, but we only take into account 
the net tax payments after the base year, discounted according to the year which they were 
made, on a present value base analysis. For the people born before year t, the sum begins in 
year t and is discounted to year t (this analysis is forward looking, so we don’t take into 
account the net taxes already paid prior to the base year). For the people born in year k > t, the 
sum begins in year k and is discounted to that same year k. The net tax payments of the people 
born after year t will also have to be discounted to year t, as it can be seen in equation (1). 
One of the crucial assumptions in generational accounting is that the behavior of 
economic agents will not change, and that fiscal policy is stable. In other words, generational 
accounting provides us with some insights regarding the “fiscal burdens” that fall upon 
current and future generations, if the current fiscal policy is maintained. With this assumption, 
it is possible to calculate the age profile of the expected average taxes paid and transfers 
received per capita for the future, starting from the age profile of payments of the base year:  
 
ℎ𝑠,𝑘,𝑖 =   ℎ𝑡,𝑡−(𝑠−𝑘),𝑖(1 + g)
(s−t)                                                                                                             (4)  
 
Basically, equation (4) states that the taxes paid and transfers received of a person in 
year s (given s > k), with an age of s – k, will be the same as those observed for people of the 
same age in year t, and adjusted for the gains in productivity between year s and the base year. 
These gains in productivity are given by the annual growth rate of productivity (g), which we 
will assume to be constant. 
For the future values of net public expenditures, we will also assume that they evolve 
at the same rate as taxes and transfers included in the net tax payments, that is, G grows at the 
rate of productivity, given by g, for future years. 
Since we know the government’s net wealth  𝑊𝑡
𝑔 , and we can determine the sum of 
the generational accounts of current generations and the present value of the sum of net public 
expenses, we can use them to determine the sum of the generational accounts of future 
generations, as a residual. More specifically:  
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Thus, the “fiscal burden” that will fall upon future generations is the part of the sum of 
present value of the net public expenditures that are not covered by government net wealth 
and by the net tax payments of current generations. With this information, even though we are 
not able to explain exactly how this “fiscal burden” that is left to the future generations is 
going to be distributed among them, if we assume that the average net tax payments per capita 
of the future generations increases by a fixed growth rate of productivity, we can actually 
estimate the average per capita present value lifetime net tax payments for the people of each 
future generation (making lifetime net tax payments a fixed share of lifetime income). Hence, 
we define the generational account of a representative agent born in year k and still living at 
time t in the following equation:  
 
𝐺𝐴𝑡,𝑘
𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅 =          ∑ Ti,k
k+D
i=t
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−(i−t) 𝑃𝑡,𝑘⁄                                                                                    (6) 
 
If we use the definition established in equation (2), we can rewrite equation (6) as:  
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                                                                                                                                    (7) 
 
Finally, we need to determine the generational accounts of future generations, which is 
given in equation (8).  
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This equation (which is a rewrite of equation (5)) gives us the part of net government 
expenses that is not financed by current generations, which is then allocated equally to be 
covered by future generations.  
But we need to take into account that the expected remaining years of life of people 
who are still alive, at year t (given by k + D – t), is different according to the year that each 
person was born. Therefore, the per capita generational accounts are not directly comparable 
among themselves. However, we can compare the per capita generational accounts of the 
people born in the base year, and the people of the future generation, since both take into 
account the net tax payments over their entire lifetimes and are discounted back to the base 
year. We can also use a relative approach, given by: 
 
 𝜋 =
𝐺𝐴𝑡+1
𝑓
𝐺𝐴𝑡
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)                                                                                      (9) 
5. Data Analysis and Assumptions 
The empirical evaluation of the intertemporal budget constraint requires: projections 
of population, taxes, transfers, and government expenditures; an initial value of government 
wealth; a growth rate and a discount rate. We consider the impact of total, not just national, 
government. We establish 2010 as the base year, and consider a 100 years range of analysis, 
that is, from 2010 to 2110. 
5.1. Population 
Since generational accounts are defined as per capita net taxes in present terms, the 
values are influenced by the size and age of the population in each generation. The size of the 
population is relevant in order to distribute the amount of net taxes needed to cover 
government expenditures and to service the debt. Since the size of future generations is 
expected to decrease in the coming years, the total amount of net taxes are going to be divided 
by a smaller number of people. In addition, the structure of the population critically influences 
the absolute amount of net taxes, since most taxes paid and transfers received are age-specific 
or highly related to the person’s age. The projections used to compute the generational 
accounts are based on the 2009 population projection estimates by age and gender provided 
INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística) from 2010, which is the base year, until 2060. These 
estimates provide four different scenarios (central, low, high and without migration), which 
are described in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Population Projections in Portugal, by Scenario 
Scenario/hypothesis Fertility index Life expectancy at birth Migration 
Low Pessimist Moderate Low 
Central Moderate Moderate Moderate 
High Optimist Optimist High 
Without Migration Moderate Moderate No migration 
  Source: INE, “Projecções de População Residente em Portugal”, 2009 
 
For each of these scenarios, the initial values (of 2008) are identical, but they 
incorporate different hypothesis regarding future values of fertility, mortality and migration 
rates. Regarding the projections for net migration, they are always positive. They display a 
linear trend (significantly increasing for the high and central hypothesis, and slightly 
decreasing for the low hypothesis) from 2007 until 2018, and they remain constant for the rest 
of the period in analysis, as it can be seen in Figure 9. Since we consider these migration 
scenarios questionable (and the hypothesis for the other two variables are “moderate”), we 
decided to use the scenario without migration for population projections by age and gender 
from 2010 until 2060. Given that we are aiming for a 100 year period analysis, we made our 
own calculations to extend the population projections to 2110. For that, we needed to estimate 
the number of people who would be born each year, as well as the number of people who 
would die each year, for each age group, from 2061 to 2110. Given the complexity of the 
model used for the projections in the previous periods (Poisson-Lee-Carter models), we opted 
for a different approach, for simplicity. We started by calculating age specific death rates 
(ASDR) for the 2010-2060 period, by year, gender and age. Then, we used these rates to 
estimate a trend function for each age group, and used this function to estimate the age 
specific death rates from 2061 until 2110. Finally, we only need to estimate the number of 
people who would be born each year. Instead of birth rates, we estimated number of births, 
since this function is more monotonic. Also, we have used only the last 10 years of the sample 
(2050-2060) to estimate the trend function, given the function shows a stabilization on the last 
years, and these results fit better the data and the other projections. 
 
 
 
 Figure 9 – Migration levels for the different scenarios 
 
 
  Source: INE, “Projecções de População Residente em Portugal”, 2009 
 
5.2. Fiscal data 
The information regarding government revenues and expenditures was retrieved from 
the DGO (Direção-Geral do Orçamento), more specifically, from the consolidated general 
government accounts (public account basis) presented in the CGE reports (Conta Geral do 
Estado) for the years available (2010 to 2015). For the years after these reports, as mentioned 
before, it is assumed that government’s revenues and expenditures that do not depend on 
demographics (the ones included in variable G) evolve at the rate of productivity, given by g. 
In other cases, we break the purchases down into age-specific components (e.g.: Expenditures 
with current transfers, mostly consisting of pension benefits) and assume that each component 
remains constant per member of the relevant population, adjusted for the overall growth in 
productivity g. This causes different components of government purchases to grow more or 
less rapidly than productivity, according to whether the relevant population grows or shrinks 
as a share of the overall population.  
In our calculations, we consider government spending (that we describe as G) as the 
sum of government consumption, subsidies and net investment (considered as capital 
expenditures minus capital revenues). 
The other components, consisting of direct taxes, social security contributions, indirect 
taxes, and current transfers (consisting mainly of social security expenditures) are highly 
dependent on population structure, and need to be assigned accordingly. Essentially, for the 
years for which government values and forecasts are available, these aggregate amounts are 
distributed by age, based on cross-sectional relative age-tax and age-transfer micro-profiles 
derived from cross-sectional microdata sets. For years beyond those for which government 
values and forecasts are available, age-specific average tax and transfer amounts are assumed 
to equal those for the latest year for which forecasts are available, with an adjustment for 
productivity growth. 
Finally, since we are considering a finite period of 100 years, we will not assume that 
the government’s net debt has to be fully paid by current or future generations until the last 
period considered in the analysis. Instead, we will consider that the generations will have to 
“service” de debt, and assume that it grows less quickly than the rate of discount, as to not 
become explosive. Therefore, in our calculations, we have assumed that the variable Wt
g
 is 
equal to zero, and the interest payments on public debt were included in the variable 𝐺𝑠, 
hence, growing at the same rate. 
5.3. Micro-profiles 
The general rule regarding tax incidence is to assume that taxes are paid by according 
to the base on which they fall upon: income taxes on income, consumption taxes on 
consumers, and so forth. In small open economies (like Portugal), there is a need to modify 
generational accounting by allocating changes in corporate capital income taxes to 
generations in proportion to their labor income. The reason is that an increase in the corporate 
income tax rate in a small open economy will produce an immediate capital outflow, thereby 
lowering the marginal product of labor and the wage; i.e., the corporate tax will be 
immediately shifted to workers. As we established in the previous section, the categories of 
taxes and transfers are set according to the consolidated general government accounts (public 
account basis) presented in the CGE of each year that are available. The taxes and transfers 
are then allocated according to income, transfer and consumption micro-profiles, estimated 
from the survey Inquérito às Despesas das Famílias from 2010/2011. Direct taxes were 
distributed based on a wage earnings profile (which is grossed up to include property income 
and self-employment earnings), as well as corporate income taxes. Since social security 
contributions are imposed as employment taxes, they were also distributed according to the 
wage profile. Indirect taxes (which mainly consist of taxes on consumption) were distributed 
according to a consumption expenditures profile. Expenditures with current transfers 
(consisting of social security and other transfers), were distributed according to a general 
transfers receipt (which consist of pensions and other transfers). As a general rule, the profiles 
obtained from the microdata are assumed to stay constant over the entire projection period. 
This procedure maintains base-year economic structures indefinitely.  
5.4. Growth and Discount rates 
It is necessary to specify an appropriate annual rate of productivity growth, since it will 
influence the projections of future values of age-specific tax payments and transfers, and an 
appropriate interest rate, in order to discount all future payments and be able to express them 
in present value terms of the base year. Despite there being a lot of uncertainty surrounding 
the definition of both the discount rate and the future productivity growth rate, the appropriate 
interest rate is mainly influenced by the risk regarding public revenues and expenditures, 
while the appropriate growth rate is mainly influenced by the EU average and the country’s 
own economic outlook in the future. Starting with the discount rate, usually, government 
revenues and expenditures have more risk than non-risky long-term government bonds, but 
they are not as risky as the return on risky assets. However, we also have to take into account 
that this risk may be different for each country, depending on the outlook of sustainability of 
public finances. In the case of Portugal, the country’s inability to finance itself at sustainable 
interest rates led to the need of a financial assistance program signed in 2011, and even 
though it is now able to finance itself at reasonable interest rates, the large deviations in the 
interest rate over the last decade generate uncertainty regarding the country’s capacity to keep 
financing itself at the current rates in the long run.  This also had an impact on the prospects 
of the future productivity growth rate, given that the corrective measures applied during these 
years to reduce government deficits and stabilize public debt had a negative impact on 
economic growth, and since these corrective policies have to be maintained for future years in 
order to generate public surpluses and decrease public debt, there is a lot of uncertainty 
regarding future economic growth rates. Given the sensitivity of generational accounts with 
respect to the values of these rates, and, as we pointed above, the uncertainty surrounding the 
definition of appropriate discount and productivity rates, it remains a standard practice to 
estimate generational accounts for a range of discount rates and productivity growth rates.  
Hence, we define three interest rates and three productivity growth rates, based on Portugal’s 
own expected interest and growth rates for different possible scenarios, provided in Table 5. 
We have also established an additional scenario, in which the variable 𝐺𝑠 grows at a rate of 
0,8%. The results from these scenarios will be further discussed in section 7.   
 
Table 5 – List of productivity growth rates (g) and discount rates (r) 
g = 1% g = 1,5% g = 2% 
r = 3% r = 5% r = 7% r = 3% r = 5% r = 7% r = 3% r = 5% r = 7% 
 
6. Results and Comparisons 
In this section, we start by making a brief analysis of the net tax payments in 2010, by 
age.  As we can see in Figure 10, the set of accounts exhibits a concave pattern with respect to 
age. When people are young, they receive transfers (e.g., child benefits or educational 
allowances) and pay consumption taxes. During their working lives, they continue to pay 
consumption taxes but also pay taxes on their labor and capital income in the form of personal 
income taxes and payroll taxes, so we can see that their net tax payments increase. When 
workers reach older ages, they start receiving transfer receipts (e.g., pensions), and so the net 
tax payments start to decline. From 60 onwards, we can see that transfer payments received 
generally start to exceed the tax payments so that net tax payments become negative, that is, 
they become net transfers. We can also see that the absolute amount of net transfers’ declines 
from 75 onwards, due to a decrease in the population levels. However, one would expect the 
net tax payments to be negative for younger generations. This has to do with the distribution 
of indirect taxes by age, which are allocated according to a micro-profile of consumption 
expenditures. Since the data provided the expenditures by households, and we needed to 
allocate them to individuals, we resorted to an equivalence scale defined as “OECD-modified 
scale”, which assigns a value of 1 to the household head, of 0,5 to each additional adult 
member, and of 0,3 to each child. And given our results, even in the case when education 
expenditures are allocated as transfers, the consumption taxes outweigh them, resulting in 
positive net tax payments. 
 
  
Figure 10 – Portugal's Net Tax Payments in 2010, in millions of dollars, by age 
 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Now, we follow with an analysis of the generational accounts in 2010 (see Figure 11 
and Table 6), and compare with the generational accounts in 1995 (see Figure 12 and Table 
7)1. We can see that the accounts are positive and increase initially with age. The present 
value of a generation’s remaining lifetime net tax payments is generally highest for 
generations at the beginning or at the middle of their work spans, as it does not include child 
and educational benefits received in youth, more and more people start to enter into the 
workforce, and they progress in their working career, earning higher levels of income and, 
therefore, paying more taxes. Then, they begin to decline for older generations, since part of 
their net tax payments were prior to the base year. The generations that become net transfers 
start at 47, and then it starts increasing again, since part of the transfer payments were prior to 
the base year. 
When workers reach older ages, the sum of future net tax payments tends to decline as 
future transfer receipts (e.g., pensions) gain in importance compared with future tax 
                                                          
1 In this base case, we are not treating public expenditures on education as transfer payments, and therefore, not 
allocating them by age, hence their value in the Table being zero (that scenario is described in Table 13). Instead, 
they are treated as government purchases and are added to the variable 𝐺, as done in Auerbach, Kottlikoff and 
Leibfritz (1999). 
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payments. We can also see that the absolute amount of net transfers’ declines from 65 
onwards, due to a decrease in the population remaining lifetime. 
If we compare our results with the generational accounts of Portugal in 1995, provided 
in Auerbach, Kottlikoff and Leibfritz (1999), we can see that the accounts follow a very 
similar pattern, with respect to age. However, we can see that the generational accounts hit 
lower values after 50 years. Comparing Figures 11 and 122, in 1995, the lowest level is 
between 50.000 and 100.000 dollars, while in 2010, it’s close to 150.000 dollars. We can also 
see that the “fiscal burden” that will fall upon future generations increased significantly. In 
1995, representative member of future generations would have to pay 48,7% (or 1,5 times) 
more taxes than a representative member of the current generation. In 2010, that value 
increased to an alarming 372,4% (or to 4,9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The values in Figure 12 correspond to the values in Table 7, updated according to the GDP deflator 1995-
2010, for comparability. 
  
 
Figure 11 – Generational Accounts 2010 (thousands of dollars) 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
 
 
Figure 12 - Generational accounts 1995 (thousands of dollars) 
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 Source: Own calculations 
 
 
Table 6 – Generational Accounts in 2010 (Base Case, in thousands of dollars) 
Age 
Income 
Taxes 
Property and 
Proprietors 
Social Security 
Contributions 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Transfers Education 
Generation 
Accounts 
0 38,9 1,0 34,9 52,3 41,0 0,0 86,0 
1 40,3 1,0 36,1 52,9 42,5 0,0 87,9 
2 41,7 1,1 37,4 53,6 43,9 0,0 89,9 
3 43,2 1,1 38,7 54,2 45,3 0,0 91,8 
4 44,7 1,1 40,0 54,8 46,8 0,0 93,7 
5 46,2 1,2 41,4 55,3 48,4 0,0 95,7 
6 47,8 1,2 42,8 56,0 50,0 0,0 97,9 
7 49,4 1,3 44,3 56,8 51,6 0,0 100,1 
8 51,1 1,3 45,8 57,5 53,3 0,0 102,4 
9 52,9 1,3 47,4 58,3 55,1 0,0 104,7 
10 54,7 1,4 49,0 59,2 56,9 0,0 107,4 
11 56,5 1,4 50,7 60,0 58,8 0,0 109,9 
12 58,5 1,5 52,4 61,0 60,7 0,0 112,7 
13 60,5 1,5 54,2 62,0 62,7 0,0 115,5 
14 62,5 1,6 56,1 63,0 64,8 0,0 118,4 
15 64,7 1,6 58,0 64,1 66,9 0,0 121,4 
16 66,9 1,7 60,0 65,2 69,1 0,0 124,6 
17 69,0 1,7 62,1 66,3 71,3 0,0 127,8 
18 71,2 1,8 64,1 67,4 73,6 0,0 130,8 
19 73,3 1,8 66,1 67,8 75,6 0,0 133,4 
20 75,1 1,9 67,9 68,3 77,6 0,0 135,6 
21 76,9 1,9 69,6 68,9 79,8 0,0 137,5 
22 78,1 1,9 70,9 69,2 81,8 0,0 138,4 
-100.0
-50.0
0.0
50.0
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150.0
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23 79,2 1,9 72,1 69,5 83,9 0,0 138,9 
24 80,4 1,9 73,4 69,7 86,0 0,0 139,5 
25 80,9 2,0 74,0 70,1 87,9 0,0 139,0 
26 80,7 1,8 73,9 70,1 90,3 0,0 136,2 
27 80,4 1,8 73,8 70,3 93,0 0,0 133,4 
28 79,9 1,9 73,4 70,2 95,4 0,0 130,0 
29 79,1 1,9 72,8 70,0 97,8 0,0 126,0 
30 78,0 1,9 71,8 69,9 100,3 0,0 121,4 
31 76,8 2,0 70,7 69,6 102,1 0,0 117,0 
32 75,7 2,0 69,9 69,6 104,5 0,0 112,7 
33 74,5 2,0 68,9 69,4 107,3 0,0 107,5 
34 73,3 2,0 67,9 69,0 109,8 0,0 102,4 
35 71,2 2,0 66,1 68,2 112,0 0,0 95,5 
36 69,4 2,0 64,4 67,7 114,6 0,0 88,9 
37 67,5 2,0 62,9 66,9 117,6 0,0 81,6 
38 65,1 2,0 60,6 66,1 120,6 0,0 73,2 
39 62,8 2,0 58,5 65,3 123,4 0,0 65,3 
40 60,2 2,1 56,2 64,6 126,6 0,0 56,4 
41 57,7 2,0 53,8 63,5 129,8 0,0 47,3 
42 55,5 2,1 52,0 62,7 133,4 0,0 39,0 
43 53,3 2,1 50,0 61,8 136,2 0,0 30,9 
44 51,1 2,2 48,1 61,2 139,8 0,0 22,7 
45 47,8 2,2 45,1 60,3 143,6 0,0 11,8 
46 45,1 2,2 42,5 59,5 147,8 0,0 1,5 
47 42,7 2,2 40,4 58,8 151,6 0,0 -7,5 
48 39,7 2,3 37,7 57,7 155,4 0,0 -18,0 
49 36,8 2,3 35,1 56,6 158,5 0,0 -27,8 
50 34,1 2,3 32,6 55,8 162,6 0,0 -37,7 
51 31,3 2,3 30,0 54,7 167,1 0,0 -48,8 
52 28,2 2,3 27,2 53,5 172,0 0,0 -60,8 
53 25,4 2,3 24,7 52,7 176,5 0,0 -71,3 
54 22,3 2,4 21,7 51,2 180,7 0,0 -83,1 
55 19,5 2,4 19,1 50,1 184,5 0,0 -93,5 
56 16,7 2,4 16,6 48,8 188,1 0,0 -103,6 
57 13,8 2,4 13,7 47,5 188,8 0,0 -111,5 
58 11,8 2,4 11,8 46,2 191,9 0,0 -119,7 
59 9,2 2,3 9,2 44,8 194,8 0,0 -129,2 
60 7,3 2,3 7,3 43,5 195,0 0,0 -134,5 
61 5,7 2,4 5,7 42,0 193,4 0,0 -137,6 
62 4,1 2,2 4,1 40,4 192,5 0,0 -141,7 
63 3,2 2,2 3,2 38,9 186,9 0,0 -139,3 
64 2,4 2,1 2,4 37,3 181,5 0,0 -137,4 
65 1,8 2,1 1,8 36,1 180,0 0,0 -138,1 
66 1,5 2,1 1,5 34,6 173,6 0,0 -134,0 
67 1,2 2,0 1,2 33,2 166,7 0,0 -129,0 
68 1,1 2,0 1,1 31,8 160,0 0,0 -124,0 
69 0,8 1,8 0,8 30,1 151,7 0,0 -118,1 
70 0,7 1,8 0,7 28,7 145,3 0,0 -113,4 
71 0,6 1,8 0,6 27,4 138,6 0,0 -108,2 
72 0,6 1,8 0,6 26,1 132,0 0,0 -103,0 
73 0,5 1,7 0,5 24,6 123,2 0,0 -95,8 
74 0,5 1,8 0,4 23,4 117,1 0,0 -91,0 
75 0,5 1,7 0,4 22,3 110,5 0,0 -85,6 
76 0,4 1,6 0,4 21,1 105,0 0,0 -81,4 
77 0,4 1,5 0,4 20,0 99,5 0,0 -77,2 
78 0,4 1,4 0,4 18,9 94,0 0,0 -73,0 
79 0,4 1,3 0,3 17,8 88,7 0,0 -68,9 
80 0,3 1,2 0,3 16,7 83,4 0,0 -64,9 
81 0,3 1,2 0,3 15,6 78,2 0,0 -60,9 
82 0,3 1,1 0,3 14,5 73,0 0,0 -56,9 
83 0,3 1,0 0,3 13,5 67,9 0,0 -52,9 
84 0,2 0,9 0,2 12,5 63,0 0,0 -49,1 
85 0,2 0,8 0,2 11,5 58,4 0,0 -45,6 
86 0,2 0,8 0,2 10,7 54,5 0,0 -42,5 
87 0,2 0,7 0,2 10,0 50,8 0,0 -39,7 
88 0,2 0,7 0,2 9,3 47,3 0,0 -37,0 
89 0,2 0,6 0,2 8,7 44,3 0,0 -34,7 
90 0,2 0,6 0,2 8,1 41,3 0,0 -32,3 
91 0,1 0,5 0,1 7,5 38,7 0,0 -30,3 
92 0,1 0,5 0,1 7,0 36,2 0,0 -28,4 
93 0,1 0,5 0,1 6,6 34,0 0,0 -26,7 
94 0,1 0,4 0,1 6,2 32,0 0,0 -25,1 
95 0,1 0,4 0,1 5,8 29,9 0,0 -23,4 
96 0,1 0,4 0,1 5,5 28,4 0,0 -22,3 
97 0,1 0,4 0,1 5,2 27,2 0,0 -21,4 
98 0,1 0,3 0,1 4,8 24,6 0,0 -19,3 
99 0,1 0,3 0,1 3,8 19,6 0,0 -15,4 
100+ 0,0 0,2 0,0 2,3 11,9 0,0 -9,4 
Future Generations 406,2 
Percentage difference (%) 372,4 
Relative indicator (π) 4,9 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Table 7 – Generational Accounts in 1995 (Base Case, in thousands of dollars) 
Age 
Income 
Taxes 
Property and 
Proprietors 
Social Security 
Contributions 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Transfers Education 
Generation 
Accounts 
0 17,8 3,9 21,6 36,4 17,9 0,0 61,8 
5 21,0 4,5 25,6 37,1 21,1 0,0 67,1 
10 24,8 5,3 30,1 37,6 24,7 0,0 73,0 
15 29,1 6,3 35,4 37,9 29,0 0,0 79,6 
20 33,7 7,3 41,0 37,9 33,9 0,0 86,0 
25 35,5 8,3 43,1 37,6 39,3 0,0 85,1 
30 33,9 8,6 41,2 36,2 45,0 0,0 75,0 
35 30,9 8,5 37,5 33,8 50,7 0,0 60,0 
40 26,3 7,8 32,0 30,5 56,8 0,0 39,7 
45 20,9 6,8 25,4 26,7 63,9 0,0 15,9 
50 14,6 5,4 17,7 22,2 70,6 0,0 -10,6 
55 8,9 4,1 10,9 17,7 75,4 0,0 -33,9 
60 5,0 2,8 6,1 13,7 74,6 0,0 -47,1 
65 2,7 1,8 3,2 10,5 67,6 0,0 -49,4 
70 1,4 1,1 1,7 8,0 54,9 0,0 -42,7 
75 0,6 0,6 0,8 5,9 41,2 0,0 -33,3 
80 0,0 0,4 0,0 4,0 29,3 0,0 -24,8 
85 0,0 0,2 0,0 2,5 18,1 0,0 -15,4 
90 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,6 4,8 0,0 -4,1 
Future Generations 91,8 
Percentage difference (%) 48,7 
Relative indicator (π) 1,5 
Source: A. Auerbach, J. Braga de Macedo, J. Braz, L. Kotlikoff, J. Walliser, “Generational Accounting in Portugal”, 1999 
 
 
However, as described in Bonin and Patxot (2004), there are some drawbacks to the 
indicators we are using: 1 – Ignoring the aging process of future generations. These indicators 
only take into account the population levels of current generations and future newborns; 2 – 
Difficulties in reflecting the effects of potential solutions (ex: increase in labor force 
participation; or structural restrictions on future net taxes); 3 – Difficulties in prediction the 
impact of corrective policies in demographic groups with different payment structures; 4 – 
Both are measured in current generational account terms, and a high value could just mean a 
low value of the denominator (generational accounts of current newborns) instead of a serious 
fiscal imbalance. In light of these shortcomings, we resort to the sustainability gap indicator, 
described in Cardarelli, Stefton, and Kotlikoff (2000): 
 
𝑆𝐺𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐺𝑠
∞
𝑠=𝑡
(1 + 𝑟)−(𝑠−𝑡) −  𝑊𝑡
𝑔 − ∑ 𝐺𝐴𝑡,𝑘
𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑡,𝑡−𝑘
𝑡
𝑘=𝑡−𝐷
 − ∑ 𝐺𝐴𝑘
𝑓 𝑃𝑘,0
∞
𝑘=𝑡+1
                         (10) 
 
This will allow us to take into account the population levels and payment structures of 
future generations. Instead of calculating the generational accounts for future generations as a 
residual, we calculate them in the same way we calculate for current generations, assuming 
that current fiscal policy is maintained. Therefore, if the sustainability gap is positive, it 
indicates that current fiscal policy is not sustainable, and there is a need to readjust net tax 
payments or government expenditures. However, it is difficult to interpret the size of the 
sustainability gap, due to the lack of a benchmark. Bonin and Patxot (2004) point out a 
solution that is usually tried out, which consists of using current GDP as a benchmark, similar 
to a debt-to-GDP ratio. The obvious problem is the short-sightedness of this indicator, which 
collides with the long term view of the generational account method. To solve this problem, 
the authors propose to use the present value of the aggregate future yearly GDP, instead of 
just current GDP. Recall that we assume that productivity grows at a constant rate (g), which 
we use to estimate the future values of GDP. This measure will give us the % by which the 
deficit must be reduced each year, in terms of GDP. 
However, Bonin and Patxot (2004) explain that the sustainability gap indicators are 
dependent on the structure of the government budget and the age specific micro-profiles, and 
are not fully comparable between countries and different periods of time. In his earlier work, 
Bonin (2001), he proposes an indicator that is neutral to these structural differences, given by: 
 
𝐿𝑆𝑡 =  
𝑆𝐺𝑡
∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑗
𝐷
𝑗=0 (
1 + 𝑔
1 + 𝑟)
𝑖−𝑡
∞
𝑖=𝑡
                                                                                                          (11) 
 
This indicator reflects a flat tax on each person, in each year, adjusted in terms of 
productivity growth and present value, needed to achieve fiscal sustainability. With the 
denominator, we are, not only taking into account the population levels, but also making the 
necessary corrective measure neutral in terms of life expectancy. However, the authors point 
out that this indicator ignores variations in gross income. We can conclude that each indicator 
has its own advantages and disadvantages, so we should rely on more than one of them to take 
conclusions. The results are presented in Table 8: 
 
Table 8 – Additional Indicators for 2010 (Base Case) 
Sustainability Gap (in millions of US dollars) 661.792,5 
Sustainability Gap (in Portuguese GDP) 3,1 
Sustainability Gap - PV of aggregate future GDP (in %) 11,3 
LS – annual flat tax needed for sustainability (in US dollars) 2.390,1 
Source: Own calculations 
 
We follow with a separate analysis of generational accounts between men and women, 
which is given by Tables 11 and 12 in the appendix. The sustainability gap indicators are a 
proportion of the values in Table 6. If we compare the two Tables, we can see that the 
generational accounts of men are higher than those of women. An analysis of each component 
that constitute the generational accounts shows that this difference results from higher income 
taxes and social security contributions, as well as lower transfers for men than for women, 
which can, mainly, be attributed to women’s higher life expectancy. 
Lastly, we provide an alternative scenario, described in Table 13 in the appendix, in 
which we treat education expenditures as transfer payments, and allocate them to individuals 
according to their age. If we compare the results with the base case, the overall generational 
accounts are lower, including for the future generations, but the percentage difference has 
increased. This outcome relates to the fact that education expenditures are highly concentrated 
on younger generations, therefore, increasing their burden when compared to older 
generations. Still, it is the case that net tax payments remain positive for younger ages. 
However, notice that the other indicators actually decrease when compared to the base case. 
The allocation of education expenditures as transfer payments will decrease the net tax 
payments, but also the 𝐺𝑠 expenditures, since these do not include education´s expenditures in 
this scenario. Since these indicators do not focus only on the newborns, but all future 
generations, the allocation of education expenditures implies that they are paid by current 
generations as well, and will prevent them from being accumulated to the future in 𝐺𝑠, which 
is paid only by future generations.   
7. Sensitivity Analysis 
As we stated in section 5.4 of this paper, generational accounts are highly sensitive to 
the values of the discount rate and the productivity growth rate. Therefore, in addition to our 
initial values (r = 5% and g = 1,5%)3 we have defined two additional discount rates (r = 3% 
and r = 7%) and two additional productivity growth rates (g = 1% and g = 2%). The results 
can be seen in Table 9.  
For a given productivity growth rate, a higher discount rate will decrease the 
generational accounts of both the current and future generations. Since generational accounts 
are expressed in present value terms, it makes sense that they are lower the higher the rate at 
which they are discounted. In relative terms, the burden for the future generations increases 
with a higher the discount rate. Given that Portugal has a high pressure on its public finances, 
which would require future generations to make higher net tax payments than current 
generations, a higher discount rate would decrease the present value of these net tax 
payments, and, therefore, increase the fiscal burden for future generations. However, notice 
that the sustainability gap indicators decrease with an increase in the discount rate. Recall 
                                                          
3 The assumed interest rate and productivity growth rate are based on the values of economic growth and interest 
rates for government bonds in recent values. 
that, for these indicators, we are calculating the net tax payments of future generations 
assuming current fiscal policy is maintained. Under the current fiscal policy, the combination 
of transfers, interests and government consumption is higher than tax payments, resulting in 
public deficits each year. With a higher discount rate, the present value for the future deficits 
will be lower. Given that the sustainability gap indicators are a variation of the present value 
of the cumulative of these deficits, they will decrease with a higher discount rate. 
For a given discount rate, the overall indicators increase with the productivity growth 
rate. Since transfers and government consumption is higher than tax payments, and all these 
variables grow at the same constant productivity rate, it is expected that the gap between 
current and future generations would increase with productivity growth. 
However, one could argue that, despite these variables growing with productivity growth, 
they should grow at different rates. In light of the policies followed by the current 
government, which is reducing deficit through cuts in public consumption, while economic 
growth is slowly accelerating, we have provided an additional scenario, described in Table 10. 
For this case, we have government consumption growing at a smaller rate than taxes and 
transfers (more specifically, they grow at at rate of g = 0,8%). Now, for a given discount rate, 
the overall indicators decrease when the productivity growth rate increases. A higher 
productivity growth will increase the value of taxes and transfers, and, therefore, widen the 
gap between net tax payments/net transfers and government consumption. Even when taking 
into account the aging structure of future generations (through the sustainability gap 
indicators), we see that overall net tax payments increase. In conclusion, higher productivity 
rates will decrease the fiscal burden of future generations if most of net tax payments are 
positive, and there is higher pressure from government consumption.
Table 9 – Sensitivity Analysis – Base Case 
 g = 1% g = 1,5% g = 2% 
 r = 3% r = 5% r = 7% r = 3% r = 5% r = 7% r = 3% r = 5% r = 7% 
GA of Newborns (thousands of dollars) 117,0 78,5 49,7 121,7 86,0 54,8 122,1 93,6 60,3 
GA of Future Generations (thousands of dollars) 514,7 384,8 299,4 543,3 406,2 312,4 571,5 429,4 326,9 
Percentage difference (%) 340,1 390,2 501,8 346,6 372,5 470,4 368,2 358,9 442,4 
Relative indicator (π) 4,5 5,1 6,4 4,5 4,9 6,0 4,7 4,7 5,7 
Sustainability Gap (in millions of US dollars) 1.193.892,0 572.490,7 334.337,9 1.460.252,1 661.792,5 370.817,7 1.812.976,3 774.445,8 414.866,4 
Sustainability Gap (in Portuguese GDP) 5,6 2,7 1,6 6,8 3,1 1,7 8,5 3,6 1,9 
Sustainability Gap - PV of aggregate future GDP (in %) 13,0 10,8 9,1 13,6 11,3 9,5 14,3 11,9 9,9 
LS – annual flat tax needed for sustainability (in US dollars) 2.977,3 2.299,5 1.873,3 3.120,9 2.390,1 1.922,5 3.270,8 2.490,7 1.978,8 
Source: Own calculation 
 
Table 10 – Sensitivity Analysis – Lower growth rate of Public Consumption (g = 0,8%) 
 g = 1% g = 1,5% g = 2% 
 r = 3% r = 5% r = 7% r = 3% r = 5% r = 7% r = 3% r = 5% r = 7% 
GA of Newborns (thousands of dollars) 117,0 78,5 49,7 121,7 86,0 54,8 122,1 93,6 60,3 
GA of Future Generations (thousands of dollars) 483,7 366,1 287,5 436,8 340,8 270,3 393,3 317,1 254,3 
Percentage difference (%) 313,6 366,5 477,8 259,1 296,3 393,7 222,2 238,9 321,9 
Relative indicator (π) 4,2 4,8 6,1 3,6 4,1 5,2 3,3 3,5 4,4 
Sustainability Gap (in millions of US dollars) 1.099.499,5 537.499,1 318.322,4 1.082.300,4 525.743,7 310.045,3 1.063.777,9 513.196,1 301.253,6 
Sustainability Gap (in Portuguese GDP) 5,1 2,5 1,5 5,0 2,5 1,4 5,0 2,4 1,4 
Sustainability Gap - PV of aggregate future GDP (in %) 12,0 10,1 8,7 10,1 9,0 7,9 8,4 7,9 7,2 
LS – annual flat tax needed for sustainability (in US dollars) 2.741,9 2.159,0 1.783,5 2.313,1 1.898,7 1.607,4 1.919,2 1.650,5 1.436,9 
Source: Own calculations 
 8. Limitations and imperfections of the GA method 
 
8.1. Theoretical limitations 
According to Raffelhüschen and Walliser (1999), the two main criticisms regarding 
the theoretical framework behind generational accounting are: 1 – the validity of the 
underlying life-cycle hypothesis (which impacts consumption patterns); 2 – the underlying 
incidence assumptions.  
8.1.1. Life-cycle hypothesis 
The neoclassical theory establishes that agents are rational and, therefore, plan their 
consumption and savings behavior throughout the life-cycle right at the beginning of their 
planning horizon, taking into account all the relevant information and the expected lifetime 
resources available to them, given by the present value of future income. As long as this 
present value does not change, agents will not alter their consumption behavior, even if the 
exact intertemporal distribution of income changes. This conclusion implies that the timing of 
taxes and transfers is irrelevant, as long as they are appropriately discounted (according to the 
discount factor) relatively to the period they are paid/received. However, there are three main 
criticisms regarding this theory: altruism (that is, a private-level intergenerational 
redistribution as described in Barro (1974)); or agents may be myopic or they may face 
liquidity constraints (as stated by Buiter (1995) or Diamond (1996)). Altruism implies that 
one’s generation well-being is positively impacted by the well-being of other generations, 
leading to intergenerational transfers. However, these private intergenerational transfers are 
not taken into consideration by generational accounts. It may be the case that, for this reason, 
in case of imbalance, generational accounts overestimates the burden left to future generations 
(if we assume that these private transfers are more likely to come from current generations in 
favor of future generations, like education). Regarding Buiter’s criticisms, on one hand, if 
agents are myopic, they would give more importance to income and consumption in the short 
run than what the life-cycle model predicts, or they would not be able to incorporate all the 
relevant information and plan their consumption as well as in the life-cycle model. On the 
other hand, even if agents are not myopic, but they face liquidity constraints, they would not 
be able to distribute their income over their life-cycle (or, at least, not as freely as without the 
constraints). Either one (or both) of these problems would imply that the timing of taxes and 
transfers will affect the agents’ utility. Overall, the empirical evidence suggest that both 
altruism (as seen in Altonji et al. (1992)) and liquidity constraints in the long run (as described 
in Hayashi (1987)) don’t have a significant effect in questioning the validity of generational 
accounts. However, CBO (1995) found significant evidence that agents give more importance 
to current income and less to lifetime income than the life-cycle model predicts. 
8.1.2. Incidence assumptions 
Regarding the concerns about the incidence assumptions, as we stated before, it is 
assumed that tax payments and transfer benefits are borne by those who formally pay or 
receive them, and that a change in the taxes or transfers will not have an impact on the choices 
of consumers and/or investors. However, as described in Buiter (1997), this may not be the 
case. For example, an increase in taxes on labor income might be partially shifted to firms. 
From a partial equilibrium analysis, the burden of the tax (and the correspondent deadweight 
loss) will depend on the elasticity of supply and demand on the labor market. For the tax to 
fall completely upon workers, and for there not to be any deadweight loss, labor supply would 
have to be completely inelastic. Even though estimating the demand and supply elasticity’s 
seems to solve this problem, we also have to take into account the possibility of the effects of 
a change in taxes on a specific market affecting other markets as well. In our example of an 
increase in labor income taxes, the cost of the wage for the firm increases, which will likely 
increase output prices as well. This effect will have a higher impact on labor intensive goods. 
Also, this tax will lead to a rearranging of the optimal combination of factors of production, 
with the goal of minimizing costs, given that this will decrease the relative price of factors of 
production that can be used as a substitute for labor. Buiter (1997) also argues that 
generational accounting may not take into account the changes on the side of the consumer, 
specifically, that consumers will simply change to less taxed substitute goods or services. 
Nevertheless, Fehr and Kotlikoff (1997) have attempted to analyze to what extent the 
incorporation of macroeconomic feedback effects may change the notion of intergenerational 
redistribution as measured by generational accounts based on simple incidence assumptions, 
and they conclude that generational accounts provide fairly good approximations.  
8.2.  Empirical limitations 
Many of the empirical objections are related to the assumptions regarding the 
projections of the variables, not only for the population, but mainly, regarding our economic 
variables. Haveman (1994) begins his argument by pointing out the underlying assumption 
that current government behavior is static. Basically, with the exception of demographic 
influences, we are assuming that no other fundamental changes in the economy occur (or that 
they change at the same constant productivity growth rate), and therefore, we are perpetuating 
the current fiscal policy of the base year indefinitely. The author argues that this assumption is 
not likely to hold, given that government policies tend to be reactive, and that fiscal policy 
will change in case of accumulation of excessive expenditures. And as a result, it is likely that 
the actual outcomes will be very different from the projections. Also, the assumption implies 
that only future generations will bear the fiscal burden of the necessary adjustments. 
However, as we established in section 4.1, the goals of generational accounting is to 
access the magnitude of the fiscal burden being left to future generations, and what corrective 
policies have to be put into place, if the current policy is maintained. 
Nevertheless, even population projections, which do not assume that population size 
and structure are maintained, are subject to errors, as it may be the case of some studies that 
underestimate life expectancy and old age dependency ratios (see Balassone et al. (2009), 
regarding the projection of the Working Group on Ageing Population (AWG) of the EU’s 
Economic Policy Committee). 
Finally, another serious concern revolves around both the future growth and the 
discount rates, not only regarding the sensitivity of the results to the values of these rates, but 
also the ambiguity of the choice of these rates, and the fact that they remain constant 
throughout the analysis window. This constant rate assumption implies that the micro-profiles 
remain constant, that taxes and transfers are only adjusted through demographic changes and 
that risk is identical for all generations, and remains constant over their life cycle. Also, the 
choice of these rates remains a difficult decision, due to the difficulty in accessing the average 
future growth of the economy g, and also the accurate risk incorporated in the discount rate r 
(not only there is wide range of interest rates, but it is likely that there are differences in terms 
of risk for the different variables. For instance, taxes and transfers have a higher risk, given 
the demographic uncertainty, when compared to government expenditures). As seen in 
section 7, we addressed this problem by defining alternative values for these rates. 
 
9. Conclusions 
Developed economies are being afflicted by slowing economic growth and population 
ageing. These factors will put more pressure on public finances and on future generations, and 
could, ultimately, generate an unsustainable situation. Due to their short-sightedness and 
arbitrary nature, current measures of fiscal sustainability, specifically, deficit and debt 
accounting, are not able to provide an accurate picture of the effects of fiscal policies. 
Hence, we resort to generational accounting, which is based on the government 
intertemporal budget constraint. It reflects a “zero-sum” characteristic, in which the debt, 
current and future public expenditures will have to be covered through net tax payments of 
the current or future generations. For a given time profile of public expenditures, the less 
current generations pay, the higher the bill left for future generations. We take this approach 
and apply it for Portugal, and compare the results with those described for the Portuguese case 
in "Generational Accounting around the World" by Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, 
and Willi Leibfritz, published in 1999. Even though the shape of the overall generational 
accounts remains the same, there is an increase in the overall value of the accounts, which 
reflects the increase of government’s weight in the economy, but more importantly, there is a 
large increase of the fiscal burden for future generations. More specifically, a representative 
member of future generations would have to pay 372,4% more taxes than a representative 
member of the current generation. Or a flat tax of 2.390,1 dollars would have to be paid by 
each person, in each year, adjusted in terms of productivity growth and present value, to 
achieve fiscal sustainability. 
Even though this approach is based on the long term effects of current fiscal policy, 
and does not incorporate potential changes in fiscal policies in the short-term, these results 
describe the magnitude of the fiscal burden being left to future generations, as well as the 
extent of necessary corrective policies needed to achieve generational balance. Even though 
there are some reasons to be more optimistic, with an increase in birth rates, a decrease in 
public deficits or an increase in economic growth, our results show that Portugal still has a 
long way to go to achieve generational balance and fiscal sustainability. 
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Table 11 – Generational Accounts in 2010 (Men, Base Case, in thousands of dollars) 
Age 
Income 
Taxes 
Property and 
Proprietors 
Social Security 
Contributions 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Transfers Education 
Generation 
Accounts 
0 45,1 0,9 40,5 56,0 43,7 0,0 98,9 
1 46,8 0,9 42,0 56,7 45,1 0,0 101,4 
2 48,5 1,0 43,5 57,7 47,2 0,0 103,6 
3 50,0 1,0 44,8 58,3 47,5 0,0 106,7 
4 51,7 1,0 46,3 58,8 48,4 0,0 109,4 
5 53,7 1,1 48,1 59,9 52,3 0,0 110,6 
6 55,4 1,1 49,6 60,3 52,2 0,0 114,3 
7 57,4 1,1 51,4 61,5 54,6 0,0 116,9 
8 59,4 1,2 53,2 62,8 57,8 0,0 118,9 
9 61,5 1,2 55,1 63,7 60,0 0,0 121,4 
10 63,5 1,3 56,9 64,4 59,8 0,0 126,2 
11 65,7 1,3 58,9 66,1 64,8 0,0 127,2 
12 67,9 1,4 60,9 67,0 65,3 0,0 131,8 
13 70,2 1,4 62,9 67,9 66,3 0,0 136,1 
14 72,6 1,4 65,1 69,0 68,7 0,0 139,5 
15 75,1 1,5 67,3 70,6 71,9 0,0 142,6 
16 77,6 1,5 69,7 71,6 72,8 0,0 147,6 
17 80,1 1,6 72,1 73,0 75,5 0,0 151,3 
18 82,6 1,6 74,4 74,2 77,5 0,0 155,4 
19 85,0 1,7 76,7 74,9 80,6 0,0 157,8 
20 87,3 1,7 78,9 75,9 83,0 0,0 160,8 
21 89,3 1,8 80,9 76,5 84,9 0,0 163,5 
22 90,8 1,7 82,3 77,3 87,1 0,0 165,0 
23 92,6 1,8 84,1 77,9 88,7 0,0 167,7 
24 94,0 1,8 85,7 78,4 90,9 0,0 169,1 
25 94,8 1,8 86,7 79,0 92,6 0,0 169,8 
26 95,0 1,9 86,9 79,7 96,0 0,0 167,5 
27 94,9 1,9 87,1 80,3 98,8 0,0 165,4 
28 94,8 2,0 87,1 80,6 101,8 0,0 162,6 
29 93,9 2,0 86,3 80,4 104,6 0,0 158,0 
30 92,8 2,0 85,3 80,5 107,7 0,0 153,0 
31 92,2 2,1 84,9 80,6 110,0 0,0 149,8 
32 90,8 2,1 83,5 80,5 112,7 0,0 144,2 
33 89,8 2,2 82,8 80,8 115,9 0,0 139,6 
34 88,9 2,1 82,2 80,8 118,9 0,0 135,2 
35 87,1 2,2 80,7 80,2 122,2 0,0 128,1 
36 84,8 2,2 78,6 79,7 125,2 0,0 120,1 
37 83,0 2,2 77,3 78,7 128,5 0,0 112,8 
38 80,8 2,3 75,5 78,3 132,0 0,0 104,9 
39 77,9 2,4 72,7 77,2 135,8 0,0 94,4 
40 74,2 2,3 69,3 76,1 139,3 0,0 82,7 
41 70,8 2,3 65,9 74,7 143,1 0,0 70,6 
42 68,2 2,3 63,8 73,6 147,3 0,0 60,7 
43 65,5 2,4 61,3 72,5 150,1 0,0 51,7 
44 63,1 2,4 59,2 71,9 153,8 0,0 42,8 
45 59,4 2,4 55,8 71,0 158,2 0,0 30,4 
46 56,8 2,5 53,6 70,1 162,7 0,0 20,2 
47 53,8 2,5 51,0 69,4 167,4 0,0 9,4 
48 50,4 2,6 47,9 68,6 172,0 0,0 -2,6 
49 46,8 2,6 44,6 67,1 177,2 0,0 -16,0 
50 43,1 2,7 41,2 66,0 182,3 0,0 -29,3 
51 39,3 2,6 37,7 64,7 187,2 0,0 -42,9 
52 35,9 2,6 34,6 63,2 192,6 0,0 -56,3 
53 32,4 2,6 31,4 62,4 197,8 0,0 -68,9 
54 28,6 2,7 27,8 60,4 202,9 0,0 -83,5 
55 25,2 2,7 24,6 58,8 207,7 0,0 -96,4 
56 22,0 2,7 21,7 57,3 212,1 0,0 -108,5 
57 18,5 2,7 18,3 55,7 214,9 0,0 -119,8 
58 15,6 2,7 15,6 54,0 220,5 0,0 -132,5 
59 12,1 2,6 12,1 51,9 223,8 0,0 -145,0 
60 9,9 2,7 9,9 50,4 225,2 0,0 -152,3 
61 7,9 2,7 7,9 48,6 223,8 0,0 -156,8 
62 5,9 2,3 5,9 46,3 223,9 0,0 -163,5 
63 5,0 2,2 4,9 44,3 213,2 0,0 -156,9 
64 3,7 2,1 3,7 42,3 208,9 0,0 -157,2 
65 3,0 2,1 3,0 41,0 207,8 0,0 -158,7 
66 2,5 2,0 2,5 39,1 197,4 0,0 -151,3 
67 2,0 2,0 2,0 37,3 188,6 0,0 -145,4 
68 1,9 1,9 1,9 35,5 179,7 0,0 -138,5 
69 1,4 1,8 1,3 33,1 169,2 0,0 -131,6 
70 1,2 1,7 1,1 31,3 160,3 0,0 -125,0 
71 1,1 1,7 1,0 30,0 152,3 0,0 -118,5 
72 1,0 1,7 1,0 27,9 142,6 0,0 -111,0 
73 0,9 1,7 0,9 26,2 130,7 0,0 -101,0 
74 0,8 1,7 0,8 24,8 124,2 0,0 -96,2 
75 0,8 1,5 0,8 23,1 115,5 0,0 -89,3 
76 0,8 1,4 0,7 21,9 109,6 0,0 -84,8 
77 0,7 1,3 0,7 20,7 103,8 0,0 -80,3 
78 0,7 1,3 0,6 19,5 98,0 0,0 -75,9 
79 0,6 1,2 0,6 18,3 92,2 0,0 -71,5 
80 0,6 1,1 0,6 17,2 86,6 0,0 -67,2 
81 0,5 1,0 0,5 16,0 81,0 0,0 -62,9 
82 0,5 0,9 0,5 14,9 75,4 0,0 -58,6 
83 0,5 0,9 0,5 13,7 69,8 0,0 -54,3 
84 0,4 0,8 0,4 12,7 64,6 0,0 -50,2 
85 0,4 0,7 0,4 11,7 59,8 0,0 -46,5 
86 0,4 0,7 0,4 10,9 55,6 0,0 -43,4 
87 0,3 0,6 0,3 10,1 51,9 0,0 -40,5 
88 0,3 0,6 0,3 9,4 48,5 0,0 -37,8 
89 0,3 0,5 0,3 8,8 45,3 0,0 -35,4 
90 0,3 0,5 0,3 8,2 42,4 0,0 -33,1 
91 0,3 0,5 0,3 7,7 39,8 0,0 -31,1 
92 0,2 0,4 0,2 7,2 37,4 0,0 -29,2 
93 0,2 0,4 0,2 6,8 35,2 0,0 -27,5 
94 0,2 0,4 0,2 6,4 33,2 0,0 -26,0 
95 0,2 0,4 0,2 6,0 31,2 0,0 -24,4 
96 0,2 0,3 0,2 5,8 30,0 0,0 -23,5 
97 0,2 0,3 0,2 5,6 29,3 0,0 -23,0 
98 0,2 0,3 0,2 5,1 26,3 0,0 -20,6 
99 0,1 0,2 0,1 4,1 21,6 0,0 -16,9 
100+ 0,1 0,2 0,1 2,6 13,8 0,0 -10,9 
Future Generations 309,7 
Percentage difference (%) 213,2 
Relative indicator (π) 3,2 
Sustainability Gap (in millions of US dollars) 224.858,6 
Sustainability Gap (in Portuguese GDP) 1,1 
Sustainability Gap - PV of aggregate future GDP (in %) 3,8 
LS (in US dollars) 1.676,7 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Table 12 – Generational Accounts in 2010 (Women, Base Case, in thousands of dollars) 
Age 
Income 
Taxes 
Property and 
Proprietors 
Social Security 
Contributions 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Transfers Education 
Generation 
Accounts 
0 32,8 1,1 29,4 48,4 38,5 0,0 73,2 
1 34,0 1,1 30,5 48,9 40,0 0,0 74,6 
2 35,3 1,2 31,6 49,6 41,6 0,0 76,0 
3 36,4 1,2 32,6 49,6 41,9 0,0 77,9 
4 37,7 1,2 33,8 50,3 43,7 0,0 79,2 
5 39,0 1,3 35,0 51,0 45,9 0,0 80,3 
6 40,4 1,3 36,2 51,5 46,9 0,0 82,4 
7 41,8 1,4 37,4 52,0 48,8 0,0 83,8 
8 43,2 1,4 38,7 52,8 51,2 0,0 84,9 
9 44,7 1,5 40,1 53,4 52,8 0,0 86,8 
10 46,2 1,5 41,4 53,8 53,2 0,0 89,7 
11 47,9 1,6 42,9 55,1 57,9 0,0 89,5 
12 49,5 1,6 44,3 55,5 57,9 0,0 93,0 
13 51,2 1,7 45,9 56,2 59,6 0,0 95,3 
14 52,9 1,7 47,4 57,1 61,9 0,0 97,3 
15 54,7 1,8 49,1 58,0 64,5 0,0 99,2 
16 56,6 1,8 50,8 58,7 65,1 0,0 102,7 
17 58,4 1,9 52,5 59,7 67,5 0,0 104,9 
18 60,2 1,9 54,3 60,5 69,7 0,0 107,3 
19 62,0 2,0 55,9 60,9 71,8 0,0 109,1 
20 63,5 2,0 57,4 61,2 73,9 0,0 110,2 
21 65,0 2,0 58,9 61,5 75,8 0,0 111,7 
22 66,1 2,0 60,1 61,5 78,0 0,0 111,7 
23 66,6 2,0 60,7 61,3 79,4 0,0 111,2 
24 67,5 2,0 61,7 61,2 81,8 0,0 110,7 
25 67,6 2,0 62,0 61,1 82,7 0,0 110,0 
26 67,0 1,7 61,6 60,8 85,5 0,0 105,6 
27 66,7 1,8 61,3 60,6 87,7 0,0 102,8 
28 65,7 1,8 60,6 60,3 90,5 0,0 97,9 
29 65,0 1,8 59,9 60,0 92,4 0,0 94,3 
30 64,0 1,9 59,2 60,0 95,1 0,0 90,0 
31 62,3 1,9 57,5 59,2 96,1 0,0 84,7 
32 61,5 1,9 56,9 59,1 97,6 0,0 81,7 
33 60,0 1,9 55,7 58,5 100,5 0,0 75,7 
34 58,6 1,9 54,4 57,9 103,3 0,0 69,6 
35 56,4 1,7 52,5 57,0 104,6 0,0 63,1 
36 55,0 1,8 51,2 56,6 106,9 0,0 57,7 
37 53,1 1,8 49,5 56,0 109,2 0,0 51,1 
38 50,4 1,7 46,8 54,9 111,9 0,0 41,9 
39 48,7 1,7 45,3 54,4 113,8 0,0 36,3 
40 47,2 1,8 44,0 53,9 116,8 0,0 30,0 
41 45,2 1,8 42,3 53,0 119,5 0,0 22,8 
42 43,5 1,9 40,8 52,5 122,2 0,0 16,4 
43 41,6 1,9 39,2 51,8 125,3 0,0 9,2 
44 39,7 1,9 37,4 51,2 128,7 0,0 1,5 
45 37,1 1,9 35,1 50,5 132,0 0,0 -7,2 
46 34,3 1,9 32,4 49,7 135,9 0,0 -17,5 
47 32,3 1,9 30,7 49,1 139,1 0,0 -25,0 
48 29,8 1,9 28,2 47,7 142,1 0,0 -34,4 
49 27,6 2,0 26,2 47,0 143,4 0,0 -40,6 
50 25,9 2,0 24,7 46,6 146,7 0,0 -47,5 
51 24,0 2,0 23,2 45,8 150,9 0,0 -55,9 
52 21,1 2,0 20,4 44,7 155,3 0,0 -66,9 
53 19,0 2,1 18,4 43,9 159,2 0,0 -75,8 
54 16,5 2,1 16,2 43,0 162,6 0,0 -84,8 
55 14,3 2,1 14,1 42,3 165,7 0,0 -93,0 
56 12,1 2,1 12,0 41,4 168,4 0,0 -100,8 
57 9,6 2,0 9,6 40,3 167,5 0,0 -106,0 
58 8,3 2,0 8,3 39,5 168,8 0,0 -110,6 
59 6,5 2,0 6,5 38,7 171,3 0,0 -117,6 
60 4,8 2,0 4,9 37,4 170,6 0,0 -121,5 
61 3,7 2,1 3,8 36,4 169,4 0,0 -123,4 
62 2,7 2,1 2,7 35,6 168,1 0,0 -125,1 
63 1,8 2,1 1,9 34,6 166,3 0,0 -125,9 
64 1,4 2,1 1,4 33,3 160,3 0,0 -122,0 
65 0,9 2,1 0,9 32,2 158,3 0,0 -122,2 
66 0,7 2,1 0,7 30,9 154,6 0,0 -120,1 
67 0,6 2,1 0,6 30,0 149,1 0,0 -116,0 
68 0,5 2,0 0,5 28,8 144,3 0,0 -112,6 
69 0,4 1,9 0,4 27,6 137,3 0,0 -107,0 
70 0,4 1,9 0,4 26,4 132,7 0,0 -103,7 
71 0,2 1,8 0,2 25,2 126,6 0,0 -99,3 
72 0,2 1,8 0,2 24,1 121,8 0,0 -95,5 
73 0,2 1,8 0,2 22,8 115,5 0,0 -90,6 
74 0,2 1,8 0,2 22,0 109,9 0,0 -85,8 
75 0,2 1,8 0,1 21,2 104,9 0,0 -81,6 
76 0,1 1,7 0,1 20,1 99,7 0,0 -77,5 
77 0,1 1,6 0,1 19,0 94,4 0,0 -73,5 
78 0,1 1,5 0,1 18,0 89,2 0,0 -69,5 
79 0,1 1,4 0,1 16,9 84,0 0,0 -65,5 
80 0,1 1,3 0,1 15,8 78,9 0,0 -61,5 
81 0,1 1,2 0,1 14,8 73,9 0,0 -57,6 
82 0,1 1,1 0,1 13,7 68,9 0,0 -53,8 
83 0,1 1,1 0,1 12,7 64,0 0,0 -50,0 
84 0,1 1,0 0,1 11,8 59,3 0,0 -46,4 
85 0,1 0,9 0,1 10,9 55,0 0,0 -43,1 
86 0,1 0,8 0,1 10,1 51,2 0,0 -40,1 
87 0,1 0,8 0,1 9,4 47,6 0,0 -37,3 
88 0,1 0,7 0,1 8,7 44,3 0,0 -34,8 
89 0,1 0,7 0,1 8,1 41,2 0,0 -32,4 
90 0,1 0,6 0,1 7,5 38,4 0,0 -30,2 
91 0,0 0,6 0,0 7,0 35,9 0,0 -28,2 
92 0,0 0,5 0,0 6,5 33,5 0,0 -26,3 
93 0,0 0,5 0,0 6,1 31,3 0,0 -24,6 
94 0,0 0,5 0,0 5,7 29,3 0,0 -23,1 
95 0,0 0,4 0,0 5,3 27,3 0,0 -21,5 
96 0,0 0,4 0,0 5,0 25,9 0,0 -20,4 
97 0,0 0,4 0,0 4,8 24,7 0,0 -19,5 
98 0,0 0,3 0,0 4,4 22,6 0,0 -17,8 
99 0,0 0,3 0,0 3,4 17,7 0,0 -13,9 
100+ 0,0 0,2 0,0 2,0 10,6 0,0 -8,4 
Future Generations 508,6 
Percentage difference (%) 594,7 
Relative indicator (π) 7,2 
Sustainability Gap (in millions of US dollars) 436.433,1 
Sustainability Gap (in Portuguese GDP) 2,0 
Sustainability Gap - PV of aggregate future GDP (in %) 7,5 
LS (in US dollars) 3.063,1 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Table 13 – Generational Accounts in 2010 (Education as transfer, in thousands of dollars) 
Age 
Income 
Taxes 
Property and 
Proprietors 
Social Security 
Contributions 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Transfers Education 
Generation 
Accounts 
0 38,9 1,0 34,9 52,3 41,0 20,4 65,5 
1 40,3 1,0 36,1 52,9 42,5 20,5 67,4 
2 41,7 1,1 37,4 53,6 43,9 20,6 69,2 
3 43,2 1,1 38,7 54,2 45,3 20,8 71,1 
4 44,7 1,1 40,0 54,8 46,8 20,4 73,3 
5 46,2 1,2 41,4 55,3 48,4 20,1 75,5 
6 47,8 1,2 42,8 56,0 50,0 20,5 77,3 
7 49,4 1,3 44,3 56,8 51,6 20,5 79,7 
8 51,1 1,3 45,8 57,5 53,3 20,1 82,4 
9 52,9 1,3 47,4 58,3 55,1 20,0 84,7 
10 54,7 1,4 49,0 59,2 56,9 20,3 87,1 
11 56,5 1,4 50,7 60,0 58,8 20,2 89,7 
12 58,5 1,5 52,4 61,0 60,7 20,5 92,2 
13 60,5 1,5 54,2 62,0 62,7 20,8 94,8 
14 62,5 1,6 56,1 63,0 64,8 20,7 97,6 
15 64,7 1,6 58,0 64,1 66,9 21,1 100,3 
16 66,9 1,7 60,0 65,2 69,1 21,4 103,2 
17 69,0 1,7 62,1 66,3 71,3 21,9 105,9 
18 71,2 1,8 64,1 67,4 73,6 22,3 108,6 
19 73,3 1,8 66,1 67,8 75,6 22,1 111,2 
20 75,1 1,9 67,9 68,3 77,6 21,6 114,0 
21 76,9 1,9 69,6 68,9 79,8 21,4 116,1 
22 78,1 1,9 70,9 69,2 81,8 21,2 117,2 
23 79,2 1,9 72,1 69,5 83,9 20,7 118,2 
24 80,4 1,9 73,4 69,7 86,0 20,3 119,2 
25 80,9 2,0 74,0 70,1 87,9 20,3 118,7 
26 80,7 1,8 73,9 70,1 90,3 20,3 115,8 
27 80,4 1,8 73,8 70,3 93,0 20,6 112,8 
28 79,9 1,9 73,4 70,2 95,4 21,0 109,0 
29 79,1 1,9 72,8 70,0 97,8 21,0 105,1 
30 78,0 1,9 71,8 69,9 100,3 21,2 100,2 
31 76,8 2,0 70,7 69,6 102,1 21,3 95,7 
32 75,7 2,0 69,9 69,6 104,5 21,8 90,9 
33 74,5 2,0 68,9 69,4 107,3 21,9 85,6 
34 73,3 2,0 67,9 69,0 109,8 21,9 80,5 
35 71,2 2,0 66,1 68,2 112,0 21,2 74,3 
36 69,4 2,0 64,4 67,7 114,6 21,4 67,5 
37 67,5 2,0 62,9 66,9 117,6 21,1 60,5 
38 65,1 2,0 60,6 66,1 120,6 20,1 53,1 
39 62,8 2,0 58,5 65,3 123,4 19,2 46,0 
40 60,2 2,1 56,2 64,6 126,6 18,1 38,3 
41 57,7 2,0 53,8 63,5 129,8 16,8 30,4 
42 55,5 2,1 52,0 62,7 133,4 16,3 22,7 
43 53,3 2,1 50,0 61,8 136,2 15,2 15,7 
44 51,1 2,2 48,1 61,2 139,8 14,6 8,1 
45 47,8 2,2 45,1 60,3 143,6 13,5 -1,7 
46 45,1 2,2 42,5 59,5 147,8 13,0 -11,4 
47 42,7 2,2 40,4 58,8 151,6 12,0 -19,5 
48 39,7 2,3 37,7 57,7 155,4 10,7 -28,7 
49 36,8 2,3 35,1 56,6 158,5 9,9 -37,7 
50 34,1 2,3 32,6 55,8 162,6 9,3 -47,0 
51 31,3 2,3 30,0 54,7 167,1 8,7 -57,4 
52 28,2 2,3 27,2 53,5 172,0 7,9 -68,7 
53 25,4 2,3 24,7 52,7 176,5 7,3 -78,6 
54 22,3 2,4 21,7 51,2 180,7 6,3 -89,4 
55 19,5 2,4 19,1 50,1 184,5 5,6 -99,1 
56 16,7 2,4 16,6 48,8 188,1 5,2 -108,7 
57 13,8 2,4 13,7 47,5 188,8 4,6 -116,1 
58 11,8 2,4 11,8 46,2 191,9 4,2 -124,0 
59 9,2 2,3 9,2 44,8 194,8 3,7 -132,9 
60 7,3 2,3 7,3 43,5 195,0 3,5 -138,0 
61 5,7 2,4 5,7 42,0 193,4 3,2 -140,9 
62 4,1 2,2 4,1 40,4 192,5 3,0 -144,7 
63 3,2 2,2 3,2 38,9 186,9 2,8 -142,2 
64 2,4 2,1 2,4 37,3 181,5 2,5 -139,8 
65 1,8 2,1 1,8 36,1 180,0 2,5 -140,6 
66 1,5 2,1 1,5 34,6 173,6 2,0 -136,0 
67 1,2 2,0 1,2 33,2 166,7 2,0 -131,0 
68 1,1 2,0 1,1 31,8 160,0 2,0 -126,0 
69 0,8 1,8 0,8 30,1 151,7 1,6 -119,7 
70 0,7 1,8 0,7 28,7 145,3 1,5 -114,9 
71 0,6 1,8 0,6 27,4 138,6 1,5 -109,7 
72 0,6 1,8 0,6 26,1 132,0 1,6 -104,6 
73 0,5 1,7 0,5 24,6 123,2 1,4 -97,2 
74 0,5 1,8 0,4 23,4 117,1 1,2 -92,2 
75 0,5 1,7 0,4 22,3 110,5 1,2 -86,9 
76 0,4 1,6 0,4 21,1 105,0 1,2 -82,6 
77 0,4 1,5 0,4 20,0 99,5 1,1 -78,3 
78 0,4 1,4 0,4 18,9 94,0 1,1 -74,1 
79 0,4 1,3 0,3 17,8 88,7 1,0 -70,0 
80 0,3 1,2 0,3 16,7 83,4 1,0 -65,8 
81 0,3 1,2 0,3 15,6 78,2 0,9 -61,8 
82 0,3 1,1 0,3 14,5 73,0 0,8 -57,7 
83 0,3 1,0 0,3 13,5 67,9 0,8 -53,7 
84 0,2 0,9 0,2 12,5 63,0 0,7 -49,9 
85 0,2 0,8 0,2 11,5 58,4 0,7 -46,2 
86 0,2 0,8 0,2 10,7 54,5 0,6 -43,2 
87 0,2 0,7 0,2 10,0 50,8 0,6 -40,3 
88 0,2 0,7 0,2 9,3 47,3 0,6 -37,6 
89 0,2 0,6 0,2 8,7 44,3 0,5 -35,2 
90 0,2 0,6 0,2 8,1 41,3 0,5 -32,8 
91 0,1 0,5 0,1 7,5 38,7 0,5 -30,8 
92 0,1 0,5 0,1 7,0 36,2 0,4 -28,8 
93 0,1 0,5 0,1 6,6 34,0 0,4 -27,1 
94 0,1 0,4 0,1 6,2 32,0 0,4 -25,5 
95 0,1 0,4 0,1 5,8 29,9 0,4 -23,8 
96 0,1 0,4 0,1 5,5 28,4 0,4 -22,7 
97 0,1 0,4 0,1 5,2 27,2 0,3 -21,8 
98 0,1 0,3 0,1 4,8 24,6 0,3 -19,7 
99 0,1 0,3 0,1 3,8 19,6 0,3 -15,7 
100+ 0,0 0,2 0,0 2,3 11,9 0,2 -9,6 
Future Generations 367,6 
Percentage difference (%) 460,9 
Relative indicator (π) 5,8 
Sustainability Gap (in millions of US dollars) 621.919,8 
Sustainability Gap (in Portuguese GDP) 2,9 
Sustainability Gap - PV of aggregate future GDP (in %) 10,6 
LS (in US dollars) 2.246,1 
Source: Own calculations 
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